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Oxytocin (OXT) has been implicated in prosocial behaviors such as trust and generosity.
Yet, these effects appear to strongly depend on characteristics of the situation and the
people with whomwe interact or make decisions. Norms and rules can facilitate and guide
our actions, with fairness being a particularly salient and fundamental norm. The current
study investigated the effects of intranasal OXT administration on fairness considerations
in social decision-making in a double-blind, placebo-controlled within-subject design. After
having received 24 IU of OXT or placebo (PLC), participants completed a one-shot Dictator
Game (DG) and played the role of the responder in a modified version of the Ultimatum
Game (UG), in which an unfair offer of eight coins for the proposer and two coins for
the responder is paired with either a fair-(5:5) or no-alternative (8:2). Rejection rates were
higher when a fair alternative had been available than when there was no alternative to
an unfair offer. Importantly, OXT did not de-or increase rejection rates overall, but reduced
the sensitivity to contextual fairness, i.e., the context of alternatives in which an offer
was made. As dictators, participants allocated less coins to the recipient when given OXT
than when given PLC, indicating a decline in generosity. These results suggest that OXT
decreases the adherence to fairness norms in social settings where others are likely to
be perceived as not belonging to one’s ingroup. While our findings do not support the
prosocial conception of OXT, they corroborate recent ideas that the effects of OXT are
more nuanced than assumed in the past.
Keywords: oxytocin, fairness, generosity, ultimatum game, dictator game, social norms, prosocial behavior, social
decision-making
INTRODUCTION
The neuropeptide oxytocin (OXT) has received much attention
for its role in social cognition and prosocial behavior (Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2008; Macdonald and Macdonald, 2010). Previous
studies have revealed that OXT strengthens cooperation by stim-
ulating trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008;
Delgado, 2008; Mikolajczak et al., 2010a,b), generosity (Zak et al.,
2007), and social perception (Guastella et al., 2008a,b; Keri and
Benedek, 2009; Gamer et al., 2010), suggesting a strong associ-
ation between OXT and empathy (Zak et al., 2007; Barraza and
Zak, 2009).
However, recent evidence specifies that these effects are more
nuanced than once assumed and often moderated by situational
or personal characteristics (Bartz et al., 2011). Some findings even
point to rather “antisocial” effects of OXT (Bartz et al., 2011),
such as increased envy and Schadenfreude (Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2009) as well as ingroup-favoritism and aggression towards out-
group members (De Dreu et al., 2010, 2011a). Similarly, OXT
diminishes cooperation when social information about the inter-
action partner is lacking (Declerck et al., 2010) and loses its
trust-enhancing effect when interaction partners are perceived as
unreliable (Mikolajczak et al., 2010a).
Since the central decisions in our life occur during interactions
with others, commonly shared beliefs, i.e., social norms, provide
a useful framework for our decisions and deeds. Fairness is a very
elementary and salient norm, for which a preference is already
observable in young children (Takagishi et al., 2010; Blake and
Mcauliffe, 2011). These social preferences are frequently investi-
gated with one-shot games, among others, the Ultimatum Game
(UG, Güth et al., 1982) and the Dictator Game (DG) (Forsythe
et al., 1994; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Fehr, 2008). Both games
involve monetary allocations between two players, with the first
player offering a division. In the UG, the second player can decide
whether to accept or reject this proposal. If accepted, the stake is
split as proposed. If the offer is rejected, neither player receives
anything. In the DG, on the contrary, the decision in unilateral
on behalf of the allocator and the second player must accept any
offer, thus remaining utterly powerless. In both games, empiri-
cal data differs from a “rational” approach of maximizing one’s
payoff (Güth et al., 1982).
The study by Zak et al. (2007) is, up to now, the only one
to investigate the influence of OXT on the behavior in the UG
and the DG. Here, participants were asked to indicate the value
they would choose if they were assigned to be proposers (offer),
responders (minimum acceptable offer or, in other words, rejec-
tion threshold) and dictators (endowment/giving), respectively.
OXT enlarged the (positive) difference between proposers’ offers
and their rejection threshold in the UG, while leaving rejection
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thresholds and DG giving unchanged. The authors conclude that
OXT increases generosity, based on the definition that generosity
means giving away more than the recipient needs or expects. In
fact, in this study, proposers were not informed about the actual
expectations (or needs) of the second player, but made hypo-
thetical “what-if”-decisions before being assigned to a role. Zak
et al. (2007) propose that this procedure, in combination with
OXT, stimulates perspective-taking and empathy in the UG, and
in turn motivates to reduce the negative emotional reaction of
the other player. They do not, however, provide an explanation
why this only holds in the role of proposers and not responders.
A true concern for others’ welfare should also be evident in altered
rejection thresholds and DG allocations. An OXT-induced “gen-
erosity” that is only evident when the second player has the power
of rejecting one’s offer, which would leave oneself empty-handed,
does not seem very generous after all, but might reflect strategic
considerations (see also De Dreu, 2012). In line with the con-
clusions of Zak et al. (2007), no OXT effects on the decision to
donate have been found (Barraza et al., 2011). A different study
by the same authors, however, reported increased generosity in
unilateral monetary allocations in relation to OXT levels in blood
(Barraza and Zak, 2009). With respect to the relation between
genetic variations in the OXT receptor and monetary transfers,
results are similarly divergent (Israel et al., 2009; Apicella et al.,
2011). Fehr (2008) and Conlisk (2011) even reason that OXT does
not boost generosity or prosociality, which is also supported by
the absence of OXT effects on the back-transfer of trustees in
a trust game (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Likewise, the initial trans-
fer of investors did not differ between OXT and placebo (PLC)
(Baumgartner et al., 2008) or when trustees were depicted as
unreliable (Mikolajczak et al., 2010a). All in all, the experimen-
tal findings are mixed and it remains thus unresolved whether
OXT actually motivates prosociality by stimulating perspective-
taking.
A modified version of the UG developed by Falk et al. (2003)
allows for a more thorough examination of perspective-taking
particularly from the side of responders. Here, the proposer
chooses from a fixed set of two distributions of the stake. An
unfair offer of eight coins for the proposer and two coins for
the responder is paired with different alternatives, most criti-
cally either a fair-(5:5) or no-alternative (8:2). Previous studies
using the modified UG paradigm have repeatedly demonstrated
that rejection rates are higher when there was a fair-alternative
than when there was no-alternative to an unfair offer (Falk et al.,
2003; Sutter, 2007; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012).
Although identical in terms of absolute payoff, the unfair offers
differ with respect to signaling fairness depending on the available
alternative. Importantly, pairing an unfair offer (8:2) with a fair
alternative (5:5) signifies an explicit violation of fairness norms
because the proposer clearly preferred not to offer an equal split,
but favored an unfair division (Radke et al., 2012). Incorporating
proposers’ perspective and judging this behavior as unkind and
unfair underlies the increased tendency to reject. In contrast,
when no alternative was available, rejection is solely based on dis-
liking the unfair outcome as such, i.e., inequity aversion (Falk
et al., 2003). Developmental studies support the notion that the
sensitivity to this manipulation of “context”, i.e., the alternative
offer (as in Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012), reflects
perspective-taking (Sutter, 2007; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009).
We used the modified version of the UG to contrast behavior
in response to unfair offers when no alternative was available to
unfair offers which were deliberately chosen over a fair alternative,
i.e., an equal split. Here, the no-alternative condition captures
the tendency to dislike and reject unequal outcomes, i.e., inequity
aversion, which is a basic social preference (Radke et al., 2012). In
accordance with previous findings (Falk et al., 2003; Sutter, 2007;
Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012), we expected responders’
rejection rates to remain substantial, but lower than in the fair-
alternative condition. The difference in rejection rates between
these two conditions assesses how sensitive responders are to the
alternative, but unselected, offer that had initially been available
to proposers. In other words, the sensitivity to the context in
which an unfair offer occurred goes beyond pure inequity aver-
sion by stirring social expectations about fairness. Importantly,
examining responder behavior in an UG setting allows for distin-
guishing social norm concerns from other motivational dynamics
that accompany proposals, e.g., the strategic rationale of offering
fair splits to minimize rejection and thereby maximize self-gain.
The current study is the first to assess the role of OXT on actual
responder behavior in the UG, i.e., reactions to others’ proposals.
If OXT promotes prosociality and perspective-taking in general,
then a larger sensitivity to context should emerge. In a simi-
lar vein, unilateral “prosocial” allocations should be higher after
OXT administration. The DG has been highlighted as a measure
of unconditional prosociality and altruism (Camerer and Thaler,
1995; Conlisk, 2011). On the other hand, however, newer research
suggests (De Dreu, 2012) that OXT motivates only parochial
cooperation. When others are unknown or unfamiliar, OXT can
effectively reduce cooperative conduct (Declerck et al., 2010).
Since no personal inferences about the other players could be
drawn in the current setting, they are likely to be perceived as not
belonging to the same group, i.e., ingroup, as oneself. Moreover,
the UG involves a limited stake, i.e., coins, with the payoffs for
the two players being inversely related. Particularly when com-
peting for the same resources, potential prosocial tendencies or
privileges might not extend to principally unknown interaction
partners. Consequently, we expected participants to adhere less to
social norms of reciprocity and fairness when distributing money
with an anonymous other. Still, as the results from previous stud-
ies are mixed, the character of the current experiment remains
rather explorative.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four male volunteers (M age = 21.46, SD = 1.93 years)
participated in this study. All of them were students and recruited
through advertisements placed across campus.
All participants were healthy and did neither report current
nor a history of neurological or endocrine disease, medication,
and drug or alcohol abuse. Exclusion criteria included age of<18
or >30, smoking more than five cigarettes per day, participa-
tion in another pharmacological study or blood donation within
the last two months, and suffering from fever, common cold or
allergic rhinitis (“hay fever”) on the day of testing. Participants
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were asked to abstain from caffeine, alcohol and nicotine for 24 h
as well as from eating and drinking (except water) 2 h prior to
substance administration.
All participants gave written informed consent to the pro-
cedures which were in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki and had previously been approved by the Medical Ethics
Committee of the Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Center
(Commissie Mensengebonden Onderzoek Region Arnhem-
Nijmegen). Participants were paid for participation.
PHARMACOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
A randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind within-subjects
design was used in this study. Participants received OXT
(Syntocinon; Novartis) or a saline solution via a nasal spray dur-
ing two sessions separated by 14 days. All sessions were scheduled
for weekdays, started at 10 a.m. and involved two participants,
who did not know each other before, being tested simultaneously.
In order to avoid any bias due to potential differences in scent
between the OXT and the saline spray, the experimenter was not
present during substance administration. An independent assis-
tant who was blind to the experimental hypotheses supervised the
procedure and left immediately after substance administration.
Participants self-administered the nasal spray with three puffs
per nostril (each with 4 IU OXT, i.e., a total dose of 24 IU). To
control for belief effects, participants as well as the experimenter
had to indicate at the end of each session which substance they
think was administered. In addition, mood questionnaires were
completed throughout the sessions to assess nonspecific effects
of OXT. Several tasks were carried out after a waiting period of
approximately 40min, a time window derived from earlier OXT
and related peptide nasal spray studies (Born et al., 2002; Kosfeld
et al., 2005; Domes et al., 2007; Gamer and Büchel, 2012), with
subjects starting the UG and DG approximately 75min after sub-
stance administration. Participants were not allowed to talk to
each other during the UG and DG.
MATERIALS
Modified ultimatum game
Procedure. Participants played the role of the responder in a
computerized version of the modified UG. Each trial started
with a fixation cross (1000ms), followed by the presentation
of the two available options (1000ms). Next, the selected offer
was encircled in red (1000ms). Subsequently, “Yes” and “No”
icons were presented while the alternatives remained visible (as
depicted in Figure 1). The task being self-paced, participants
had unlimited amount of time to press one of two buttons on
the keyboard to indicate their decision. Participants’ response
remained on the screen for 2000ms before the next round
started.
Participants were led to believe that they were coupled with
data from subjects who had previously participated as proposers.
They were told that they would play every round with a new
partner who would make an offer by selecting one of the two
options and their task was to decide whether to accept or reject
that particular offer. If accepted, the coins were distributed as pro-
posed; if rejected, neither player received anything. Participants
were notified that at the end of the experiment, a random num-
ber of rounds would be selected to determine their payoff and
FIGURE 1 | Display of the decision phase in the fair-alternative condition
of the modified UG. The left panel shows the name and silhouette of the
proposer at the top (here “Proposer”) as well as the name of the
participant underneath (here “You”). The two potential distributions are
specified by red and blue coins (red for the proposer, blue for the responder;
here 8:2 vs. 5:5). The selected offer is encircled in red. The participant
has to decide whether to accept (“Yes”) or reject (“No”) the offer via
button press.
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that proposers would be paid in the same manner after all data
from responders had been collected. It was pointed out that
participants’ decisions affected both their own and the other
players’ financial outcome. It was ensured that participants’ earn-
ings varied between the two experimental sessions and between
participants sitting in the same room. None of the participants
indicated doubt about the cover story or about the bonus not
being linked to their actual choices.
Design and analyses. In order to contrast behavior in response
to unfair offers (8:2) when no alternative (8:2 vs. 8:2) was available
to unfair offers which were deliberately chosen over a fair alterna-
tive (5:5 vs. 8:2), i.e., an equal split, a repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted for the rejection rate of unfair offers with sub-
stance (two levels: OXT vs. PLC) and context (two levels: fair vs.
no alternative) as within-subject factors. Hence, the factor context
pertains to the alternative outcome that had not been selected.
The fair-alternative condition can be seen as an explicit version of
the classic UG where any offer is usually compared to a potential
equal split. Pairing an unfair offer with a fair alternative consis-
tently leads to highest rejection rates (Falk et al., 2003; Sutter,
2007; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012). In contrast, the
rejection rate in the no-alternative condition is likely to reflect the
basic tendency for inequity aversion (Falk et al., 2003; Ohmura
and Yamagishi, 2005). Although the two identical distributions do
not permit a real choice for proposers, responders’ rejection rates
remain substantial (Falk et al., 2003; Sutter, 2007; Gürog˘lu et al.,
2009; Radke et al., 2012). Importantly, the difference in rejection
rates between the no-alternative and the fair-alternative condi-
tion can be regarded as a measure of the sensitivity to contextual
fairness.
Two additional distributions were used as to induce variance
in the set of offers and to avoid suspicion from participants being
faced with only 8:2 and 5:5 splits on all trials. For this pur-
pose, we included hyperfair (2:8 vs. 8:2) and hyperunfair (10:0
vs. 8:2) conditions in the game. However, for the hyperfair con-
dition, it is still unresolved what motivates the decision to accept
or reject (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Sutter, 2007). Importantly, with
regard to fairness norms, both offers are equally unfair, one being
advantageous to the proposer and the other being advantageous
to the responder. As it is not obvious which choice is favor-
able according to social norms and expectations, interpreting this
condition remains particularly challenging. With regard to the
hyperunfair condition, results based on similar paradigms are
mixed. Whereas Falk et al. (2003), Gürog˘lu et al. (2009) and
Radke et al. (2012) do not find significant differences between
the hyperunfair and no-alternative condition, the experiment of
Sutter (2007) reveals higher rejection rates in the no-alternative
(8:2) than in the hyperunfair-alternative condition (10:0) for
university students. These inconsistent findings warrant caution
when interpreting the results from the hyperunfair-alternative
condition and have entailed its exclusion from the design and
analyses previously (Gürog˘lu et al., 2010).1 For these reasons, we
1Note that there was another condition in which proposers were deprived of
their control over an offer, which, however, extends the focus of the current
paper and will be reported elsewhere.
restricted the analyses to the two levels of context that permit a
solid, unambiguous investigation of the role of OXT in fairness
considerations.
Each combination of selected and unselected offers was pre-
sented 16 times (counterbalanced for proposers’ gender and
position of the unfair offer). As the no-alternative condition leads
to an 8:2 offer for either alternative, an unfair offer (8:2) was pre-
sented in five of the eight conditions, equivalent to 80 trials. The
three genuine alternative offers (i.e., 5:5, 2:8 or 10:0) were selected
on 48 trials, yielding 128 trials in total. Contrary to subjects’
belief, all choices were computer-generated.
Dictator game
After completion of the modified UG, participants played a
single-trial DG with an anonymous other who was repre-
sented by a gender-ambiguous silhouette and name. Ten red
coins were presented similar to the display in the modified
UG. Participants had an unlimited amount of time to choose
how many coins they wanted to give to the other player
who, as it was emphasized, could not influence the outcome,
but would be paid contingent upon their decision. Responses
were made by pressing the corresponding number on the key-
board.
RESULTS
MODIFIED UG
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of context, F(1, 23) = 15.80,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.41, indicating that rejection rates were higher
in the fair-alternative condition (M = 54.95%) than in the no-
alternative condition (M = 22.4%).Moreover, there was an inter-
action between substance and context, F(1, 23) = 4.44, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.16. Further analyses demonstrated that the difference in
rejection rates between the fair-alternative condition and the
no-alternative condition was smaller after OXT administration
(M = 27.08) than after PLC (M = 38.02). The effect of sub-
stance was not significant, F(1, 23) = 0.02, p = 0.88, η2 < 0.01.
Rejection rates are depicted in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 | Rejection rates of unfair offers with regard to the
alternative offers and the substance received. Overall mean percentage
and standard errors of rejection of 8:2-offers are displayed. The main effect
of context is indicated by an asterisk(∗ ), p < 0.01.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 193 | 4
Radke and de Bruijn Oxytocin decreases the adherence to fairness norms
DICTATOR GAME
The number of coins allocated to the recipient was smaller
when participants had received OXT (M = 1.63, SD = 2.3;
Median = 0) than when they had received PLC (M = 2.71, SD =
2.44; Median = 2), Z = −2.06, p = 0.04 (two-tailed Wilcoxon
Test). Figure 3 depicts the histogram of allocations. In the PLC
condition, the distribution is bimodal, with seven participants
giving zero coins (29.2%) and six giving five coins, i.e., half of
the stake (25%). After OXT administration, the distribution of
endowments is unimodal, peaking at zero (N = 13; 54.2%) and
five participants splitting equally (20.8%).
EFFECTS OF ORDER OR PARTICIPANTS’ BELIEF OF SUBSTANCE
ADMINISTRATION
Adding the order of substance administration or subjects’ belief
about the substance administered as between-subject factors to
the ANOVAs did not yield any significant effects or interactions
(all ps > 0.28). Neither participants nor the experimenter were
able to detect the correct order of substance administration above
chance level (participants: M = 47.83%; t(22) = −0.204, p =
0.84; experimenter: M = 33.13%; t(23) = −1.696, p = 0.10).
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to explore the role of OXT in fairness consid-
erations that imply social norms. It was the first experimental
approach of administering OXT intranasally in order to assess
actual responder behavior in an UG setting. The modified version
of the UG allowed for investigating perspective-taking from the
side of responders as this role is related less to strategic, but more
to fairness considerations. Additionally, for a direct comparison
with the only previous pharmacological study using the UG/DG
(Zak et al., 2007), the DG was included to capture unconditional
generosity.
Rejection rates in the modified UG were higher when a fair
alternative had been available than when there was no alternative
to an unfair offer-an effect that has been frequently shown (Falk
et al., 2003; Sutter, 2007; Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Radke et al., 2012).
Importantly, OXT did not generally de-or increase rejection rates,
but reduced the sensitivity to contextual fairness. Whereas a typ-
ical, bimodal distribution of allocations was observed in the PLC
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of Dictator allocations after OXT vs. PLC
administration.
condition of the DG, OXT skewed this pattern in the direc-
tion of enlarging one’s own gain. Taken together, OXT appears
to decrease the amount to which one acts according to social
rules and norms. In the DG, it decreases unconditional generos-
ity, and in the UG, the alternative, unselected offer is taken less
into account. Notably, participants were less responsive to cues
that stimulate perspective-taking bymeans of inferring proposers’
motives for selecting an unfair offer (e.g., Gürog˘lu et al., 2009).
These results are clearly at odds with the notion of OXT
inducing generally prosocial tendencies (Zak et al., 2007; Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2008; Macdonald and Macdonald, 2010). Instead,
they fit with recent evidence suggesting rather “antisocial” effects
of OXT (Bartz et al., 2011), ranging from negative interpersonal
feelings, such as increased envy and Schadenfreude (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2009) to intergroup behavior, e.g., ingroup-
favoritism (De Dreu et al., 2010, 2011a). Importantly, in the
absence of social information about the interaction partner, OXT
decreases cooperation (Declerck et al., 2010). Along these lines,
De Dreu (2011b, 2012) argues that OXT-induced “goodwill” is
not general, but in fact parochial, and does not extend to mem-
bers that are perceived to be unreliable (Mikolajczak et al., 2010a)
or do not belong to one’s ingroup. This limited benevolence is
likely to sustain intra-group reciprocity and fits with findings
from animal literature (e.g., Campbell, 2008).
Social norms are not merely shared by others, but, impor-
tantly, also sustained by others’ endorsement and therefore serve
the cohesion of social groups. Violating social expectations often
leads to disapproval by others and, depending on the nature of the
particular norm, feelings of anxiety, guilt or embarrassment on
the side of the violator (Elster, 1989). Importantly, these negative
emotions can also arise when anticipating to violate social norms
(Elster, 1989). Enhanced amygdala activation has been associ-
ated with own intentional norm violations (Berthoz et al., 2006)
as well as with judging actions as reflecting deceptive intentions
(Grèzes et al., 2004). Even in anonymous settings, individuals
avoid circumstances that enable them to deceive others to their
own financial advantage (Shalvi et al., 2011). Rooted in the desire
not to behave in an immoral and socially inconsiderate manner,
people are inclined to satisfy others’ expectations and to avoid
social interactions that involve conflicting interests or a tempta-
tion to exploit (Dana et al., 2006; Shalvi et al., 2011). Given that
OXT attenuates responses to stress, threat and anxiety, particu-
larly in social situations (Heinrichs et al., 2006; Heinrichs and
Domes, 2008; Ditzen et al., 2009; Norman et al., 2010; Bartz et al.,
2011), OXT is likely to diminish the concern about other people’s
disapproval. In patients with social anxiety disorder, OXT reduced
exaggerated negative mental self representations (Guastella et al.,
2009). Therefore, acting against the rules of social conduct could
be viewed as less threatening and more permissive, resulting in
being a more feasible behavioral option.
Apart from its anxiolytic effects, OXT is involved in facili-
tating social categorization (De Dreu, 2012). Although we did
not intend to manipulate group membership, the setting of our
experiment may have contributed to such a classification. The
other players with whom participants interacted via the computer
were represented by black silhouettes and names consisting of
their first name and the first letter of their last name. Moreover,
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every UG round was played with a new partner, preventing par-
ticipants from familiarizing with them and developing reciprocal
patterns. In contrast, a fellow participant of the same gender was
present in the same room and busy with the same task. This might
have induced a distinction between the fellow participants being
similar to oneself and belonging to the same group, whereas the
other players changed frequently and did not share these “estab-
lished” commonality of the ingroup. OXTmight have fostered the
perception of this contrast, which is in line with previous evidence
on unkind behavior towards non-ingroup members (De Dreu,
2012). Bearing in mind that the gender-ambiguous silhouette and
name used in the DGdoes not allow for deducing any identity-not
even for a fundamental inference based on gender-it appears that
“antisocial” effects of OXT are inversely related to the information
available about the other player (see also Declerck et al., 2010).
However, these speculations need to be directly tested in future
studies since our design did not manipulate intergroup dynamics
on purpose. In addition, it should be investigated in how far OXT
might alter the perception of and reaction to ambiguous social
cues.
Note that our study differs from the one of Zak et al. (2007)
in two central methodological aspects: First, participants of Zak
et al. made choices in rather hypothetical situations, i.e., as if
they were proposers, responders, and dictators, preceding the
assignment of definite roles. In contrast, in the current study,
participants (as responders) always reacted to offers from pro-
posers, which puts more emphasis on actual decision behavior.
Closely related is the lack of an explicit reference point in the
classic UG (as used by Zak et al.) so that the fairness norm of
a potential equal split remains implicit (Radke et al., 2012). By
pairing an unfair offer with a fair alternative (as in the current
design), an explicit violation of fairness norms can be signified
and context effects can be captured. Second, Zak et al. (2007)
administered 40 IU in a between-subject manner, whereas the
current study made use of a dose of 24 IU and a within-subjects
design. Although 24 IU has emerged as the conventional dosage
for OXT research, the effects of dose, e.g., whether they are linear
or follow a different functional mapping, should be thoroughly
investigated in clinical trials. In the absence of such trials, the
exact pharmacokinetics of OXT remain unknown. Importantly,
however, the current study is based on data suggesting a time
window of up to 100–120 minutes in CSF after intranasal neu-
ropeptide administration (Born et al., 2002) and OXT effects
for at least 90min (e.g., Domes et al., 2010; Gamer et al., 2010;
Gamer and Büchel, 2012). Recently, results were reported for
tasks starting 75–85 minutes after OXT administration, with the
entire experimental session lasting from 45 until 120minutes
post-administration (Ellenbogen et al., 2012).
As the DG was always administered after the UG, we cannot
entirely rule out possible carry-over effects from the previous
interactions in which participants faced many unfair offers. Yet,
it seems unlikely that the task order is responsible for the cur-
rent results as the effect was restricted to the OXT session and
not present when participants received PLC. Besides, we found
no effects of session order or mood that might explain our results
in terms of unspecific substance effects.
In conclusion, our results indicate that OXT reduces the sensi-
tivity to fairness considerations based on perspective-taking (UG)
and generosity (DG). The current findings add to a growing body
of literature on differential effects of OXT that essentially depend
on situational or personal characteristics (Bartz et al., 2011) as
well as the nature of social cues (Declerck et al., 2010; De Dreu,
2012). Tuning one’s behavior according to the attributes of one’s
interaction partner is highly adaptive and restricting prosocial
behavior to one’s ingroup is likely to strengthen group cohe-
sion and fitness. A facilitated social categorization, e.g., based
on group membership, can be useful under conditions of uncer-
tainty as it reduces the threat of non-reciprocation. Along these
lines, the currently demonstrated decreased adherence to social
norms is usually only advantageous in the short run and towards
non-ingroup members. Therefore, replications and extensions to
long-lasting social relationships are necessary to investigate the
mechanisms behind OXT-induced alterations of social behavior
and their modulation by situational and interpersonal factors.
After all, it might be beneficial that OXT does not motivate
prosocial tendencies towards anyone.
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